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DOES STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT ENCOURAGE ENVIRONMENTAL 
REPORTING? THE MEDIATING ROLE OF FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Abstract 
Stakeholder engagement policies become to be a relevant strategy in firms because it may 
signal stakeholders the commitment of firms with stakeholder’s needs and demands. In this 
regard, in this research we aim to examine if firms with stakeholder engagement policies tend 
to disclose more environmental information. Additionally, we further analyse the moderating 
role played by firm performance on the association between stakeholder engagement and 
environmental disclosure. As far as we know, prior research has not addressed these two 
questions. Our evidence shows that firms with stakeholder engagement policies are more likely 
to report environmental information, while firm performance moderates negatively the 
association between stakeholder engagement and environmental disclosure. These findings 






















1. INTRODUCTION  
Stakeholder engagement (SE) is a relevant factor in the integrated reporting process of 
a firm because it shows if companies are receptive to the legitimate demands, interests and 
needs of crucial stakeholders (Manetti and Bellucci, 2016). SE lets us know if firms engage 
with relevant stakeholders in their strategic and business decisions in order to get common 
outcomes. Firms have to interact with key stakeholders to survive in increasingly challenging 
business environments and, therefore, a strong stakeholder engagement model is essential for 
firms to be able to understand and react to legitimate stakeholder concerns. 
Authors such as Bebbington et al. (2007) and Brown and Dillard (2014) argue that SE 
can be an influential instrument for dialogic communication and for learning in an interactive 
mutual way while also promoting social change and transformative action. Furthermore, SE 
may be a milestone policy in environmental disclosure as it allows firms to cooperate with their 
stakeholders in a two-way dialogue, in which firms and stakeholders mutually learn from this 
collaboration and potentially amend their strategies, behaviours and expectations (Manetti & 
Bellucci, 2016; Manetti, Bellucci, & Bagnoli, 2016).  
According to Dienes et al. (2016), the most analysed drivers of environmental disclosure 
are ownership structure, company size and media visibility. However, the role played by 
corporate governance mechanisms on environmental reporting has received less attention by 
earlier researchers, who have focused mainly on factors such as board composition, capital 
structure or profitability, among others. The evidence concerning the association between these 
mechanisms and the disclosure of environmental issues has been inconclusive. The analysis of 
the impact of SE on corporate disclosure has been also scarce. In this regard, Kaur and Lodhia 
(2014) reported that SE is a determinant of sustainability reporting because it transmits issues, 
material concerns and aspirations of crucial stakeholders. Herremans et al. (2016) found that 
SE’s strategy explains diversity in sustainability reporting. Chen (2018) also showed that the 
level of SE has a positive impact on sustainability reporting quality. Nevertheless, the effect of 
firms’ SE policies on environmental disclosure has not been addressed by past research, as far 
as we know.  
On the other hand, firm performance can be considered an indicator of the long-term 
survival of companies just like a strong SE process. But, it remains unresolved how the 
interaction between SE and firm performance will affect environmental reporting. In this 
regard, does corporate performance moderate the association between SE and environmental 
disclosure? Thus, the aim of this paper is to analyse if SE encourages environmental reporting 
3 
in a sample of international firms. Additionally, we also examine the moderating role played 
by firm performance on the relationship between SE and environmental reporting.  
Our findings show that SE is positively associated with environmental disclosure. 
Furthermore, firm performance moderates negatively the positive effect of SE on the reporting 
of environmental information.  
Through this empirical examination, our purpose is to contribute to the stakeholder 
theory and environmental disclosure empirical evidence by showing that SE policies of firms 
are positively associated with environmental disclosure. SE is an important part of good 
business practices and it may be helpful for managing risks successfully and for achieving 
enhanced stakeholders’ benefits. SE brings shared value to society and business. Environmental 
information deficit may be improved by enhancing the relationships with vital stakeholders, 
namely, by implementing SE policies in firms. Additionally, preceding research has focused on 
examining how SE policies affect CSR disclosure, sustainability reporting or voluntary 
disclosure, in general terms. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in 
addressing the impact of SE strategies on environmental disclosure individually and in 
analysing the moderating role of firm performance on this association. In this regard, our 
evidence shows that the positive impact of SE policies on environmental disclosure is 
negatively moderated by firm performance. Thus, firms with good performance will tend to 
mitigate the reporting of environmental issues if they have also implemented SE policies. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that the analysis of the relationship between SE strategies 
and environmental disclosure and the moderating role played by firm performance will improve 
existing literature beyond pre-conceived views and will make a productive ground for further 
research.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section two, we describe the theoretical 
framework and the hypotheses. In section three, the methodology and variables used are 
provided. In section four, we analyse and discuss the findings and, finally, in section five, the 
conclusions, implications and limitations are drawn.  
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES  
2.1 Conceptual Framework  
We build our conceptual framework on stakeholder theory, which argues that 
organisations have to inform stakeholders the effects of those operations that affect them 
(Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997). This communication between firms and stakeholders 
will lead to a balance of benefits and interests. One of the different ways used by firms to attain 
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a dialogue with stakeholders is through the reporting process (Morsing and Schultz, 2006), a 
formalised means of communication to disclose firm’s performance such as environmental or 
social actions (Kaur and Lodhia, 2018). Stakeholder approach also suggests that firms are more 
likely to report information about environmental and social matters when their reputation and 
image face to a legitimacy crisis, for instance, when stakeholders have a negative perception or 
opinion of a firm due to a company’s behaviour. Firm managers will tend to report the 
information expected by relevant stakeholders in order to gain or maintain their support. 
Preceding research (i.e., Patten, 1992; Deegan et al., 2002) supports these ideas by showing that 
when firms perceive that their legitimacy may be threatened lead them to disclose more 
corporate social responsibility information such as environmental issues. By this way, 
organisations may impact on the decision of those key stakeholders.  
Contrary to this view, some organisations may be willing to voluntarily disclose 
environmental or social information because they are interested in addressing and 
understanding stakeholders’ interests and demands. Stakeholders’ opinions and views can be 
collected through engagement and ongoing stakeholders’ dialogue (Cooper and Owen, 2007). 
Through this consultation process, organisations, and particularly their managers, can address 
expectations’ stakeholders through stakeholder engagement policies.  
Firms may develop three strategies in order to engage stakeholders, according to 
Morsing and Schultz (2006): informing, responding and involving. When organisations inform 
stakeholders, they are attempting to show them their actions and operations in one-way 
communications and, according to Herremans et al. (2016), most times firms use this SE in 
order to access vital resources at least cost.  
On the other hand, some firms also integrate the “responding” SE in the reporting 
process. This two-way communication is asymmetrical because firms transfer more information 
to stakeholders than vice versa and can be face-to face or not. With this reporting process, 
organisations may get opportunities to improve their market power or competitiveness and 
might search for business opportunities or prevent damage (Van Huijstee and Glasbergen, 
2008).  
Finally, the “involving” SE is also a two-way communication process based on an active 
dialogue between organisations and relevant stakeholders, requiring symmetrical information 
both from firms to stakeholder and vice versa. In this SE, all key stakeholders are involved in 
joint decision-making or joint management of a project. Therefore, the different SE’s strategies 
will imply the disclosure of information by organisations in order to keep stakeholders informed 
for meeting their expectations.  
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Gao and Zhang (2001) support the view that organisations can benefit from stakeholders 
and vice versa. Stakeholders may impact firm’s goals through their participation and activities 
by benefiting organisational performance such as social and environmental performance. 
Therefore, this leads us to think that the integration of SE in the decision-making process may 
result in a better organisational performance. But, stakeholders can be also impacted by firm 
goals, which attributes them the right for SE. This requires firms to disclose more information 
about the impact of their operations on the environment and the society in order to address 
stakeholders’ demands and interests.  
These arguments seem to support the idea that firms implementing SE policies will be 
more likely to report environmental information. According to Isenmann and Kim (2006), firms 
need to cooperate with their stakeholders when preparing sustainability reports in order to detect 
environmental and social matters as they perceive them. This cooperation can be reached by 
adopting SE strategies. By this way, organisations may adapt strategies and policies in line with 
stakeholders’ interests and expectations, avoiding ineffective actions and initiatives (Yau, 
2012).  
 
2.2 Hypotheses development 
2.2.1 Stakeholder engagement and environmental reporting  
According to the Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability (ISEA, 1999, p. 91), SE 
can be defined as “the process of seeking stakeholder views on their relationship with an 
organisation in a way that may realistically be expected to elicit them". In words of Andriof and 
Waddock (2002, p. 42), SE can be described as "trust-based collaborations between individuals 
and/or social institutions with different objectives that can only be achieved together" and Gable 
and Shireman (2005, p.9) define it as "a process of relationship management that seeks to 
enhance understanding and alignment between company and their stakeholders." These 
definitions support the idea that in SE two parties interact; firms and their stakeholders. This 
interaction provides benefits from firms to stakeholders and vice versa. In this regard, 
companies with active SE policies may voluntarily disclose information such as social and 
environmental matters. As a result, stakeholders receiving such information may benefit firms 
by providing their feed-back to firms, which might enhance firms’ legitimacy and reputation. 
Therefore, this may lead firms to be interested in maintaining and improve their SE strategies.  
Few authors (Manetti, 2011; Manetti and Toccafondi, 2012; Onkila et al., 2014; Prado‐
Lorenzo et al., 2009) show that SE policies may have an effect on sustainability disclosure. 
Bellucci et al. (2019) also find that firms, which implement a two-way communication with 
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their stakeholders, report stakeholder perceptions, problems in engaging stakeholders and what 
actions are thinking to take for interacting with stakeholders. This evidence finds that an 
effective SE is positively related to sustainability reporting. Dobbs and Van Staden (2016) 
demonstrate that voluntary reporting is determined by factors such as assurance, CSR 
committees and SE. Adams and Frost (2006) demonstrate that firms engaging stakeholders with 
their web pages disclose more social and environmental performance. Hassan and Ibrahim 
(2012) reveal that firms with SE policies tend to disclose information on specific environmental 
activities such as packaging, waste management, recycling, climate change risk, climate change 
activities, and carbon footprint.  
Most of past evidence shows the effect of SE on sustainability reporting, but there is no 
literature focused on examining the relationship between the existence of firms’ SE policies 
and environmental reporting, as far as we know. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Stakeholder engagement policies are positively associated with environmental 
reporting 
 
2.2.2 The moderating role of firm performance 
Previous studies have analysed the relationship between board characteristics and firm 
value (e.g., Kiel & Nicholson, 2005, Westphal & Bednar, 2005, Jermias & Gani, 2014). Most 
of these studies agree that it is vital that boards are effective in performing the functions 
entrusted to them, since in this way they will create value in firms and, hence, lead to better 
performance (Aguilera, 2005). Some of these papers examine the role of board of directors by 
linking the organization with its environment, arguing that the board of directors is necessary 
to attract resources to improve firm performance. This can be possible for the ties and contacts 
that the directors have with their surroundings (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Hillman, Cannella & 
Paetzold, 2000). 
Relationships between stakeholders and companies may trigger agency problems due to 
the information asymmetries between them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Due to the existence 
of information asymmetries and incomplete contracts, there are agency conflicts between 
organisations and stakeholders that are associated with an agency cost. Firm performance may 
allow these costs to be reduced by enhancing environmental reporting. Authors such as 
Omnamasivaya and Prasad (2016) and Alipour et al. (2019) find a positive relationship between 
environmental disclosure and corporate performance. This is due to the fact that more 
environmental disclosure may improve the firm's reputation and, as a consequence, may 
improve its firm value. On the contrary, Sarumpaet (2005) shows that environmental 
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performance is not associated with financial performance, and Malarvizhi and Matta (2016) 
also find that there is no relationship between environmental disclosure and corporate 
performance. The no-association between environmental reporting and firm performance can 
be due to the fact that companies report environmental information, although their 
performances are low. As shown, it seems that most past research is focused on exploring the 
effect of environmental disclosure on firm performance, but there is less research in the inverse 
way. In this regard, Cormier and Magnan (1999) find that big companies with good financial 
performance tend to disclosure more environmental information. Marshall et al. (2009) show 
that firm performance is positively associated with the quality of voluntary environmental 
disclosure and Matsumura et al. (2014) also demonstrate the positive impact of corporate 
performance on the voluntary disclosure of carbon emissions.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, the moderating impact of firm performance on 
the relationship between SE and the disclosure of environmental information has not been 
analysed. Thus, the effect of how good firm performance affects environmental disclosure when 
interacting with SE merits our attention. The coexistence of SE policies with a higher firm 
performance is expected to impact positively on environmental reporting. Firms with SE 
strategies will be more likely to disclose environmental reporting in order to show a greater 
commitment with stakeholders’ interests and needs. Additionally, companies with a better 
corporate performance may signal society and stakeholders an orientation toward economic 
goals more than toward social and environmental goals, which may be perceived negatively by 
stakeholders and society. Therefore, a higher disclosure of environmental information might 
help mitigate this negative perception.  
According to this, it is reasonable to suggest that a higher firm performance will 
positively moderate the relationship between SE policies and environmental reporting. In view 
of the above, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H2: Firm performance moderates the relationship between stakeholder engagement 
policies and environmental disclosure  
 
3. EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
3.1 Sample 
Our initial unbalanced panel data sample is taken from an initial population of 32,962 
firm-year observations for the period 2007-2018. From this initial sample, we have removed 
financial entities and those firms for which not all relevant data were available. The exclusion 
of financial entities is due to the fact that they prepare their financial statements by complying 
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with different accounting rules than non-financial firms comply, which makes more difficult to 
compare the financial statements of financial and non-financial firms. Thus, the final sample is 
composed of 16,807 firm-year observations collected from the Thomson Reuters. In our sample 
are represented firms from 16 countries. In Table 1, we present the percentage representation 
of each country in our sample, and the most represented countries are United States, Canada 
and Japan with 40.01%, 12.80% and 12.67%, respectively. In contrast to these figures, Austria, 
Norway and New Zealand have the lowest representation in the sample with, 0.4%, 0.5% y 
0.9%, respectively. 
Insert Table 1 here 
The Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC) is the industry classification 
used in this research. In Table 2, we provide the following nine industries considered: basic 
materials, consumer cyclicals, consumer non-cyclicals, energy, healthcare, industrial, 
technology, telecommunications services and utilities. The industries with the highest 
representation are industrial, consumer cyclicals and basic materials with 21.30%, 17.90% and 
12.00%, respectively. Contrary to this, telecommunications services and consumer non-cyclical 
show the lowest representation with 4.60% and utilities with 7.30%.  
Insert Table 2 here 
 
3.2 Dependent variable 
Environmental reporting is our dependent variable and is defined as ENV_REPORT. 
This variable is calculated as the ratio between the aggregation of 58 items focused on 
environmental issues and the total number of items analysed, in line with Gallego-Álvarez et 
al. (2017). If the company discloses information concerning each item, it will take the value 1 
and 0, otherwise. The 56 items analysed are split up in three groups: resource use, emissions 
and innovation, as provided in Table 3.  
Insert Table 3 here 
3.3 Independent variables 
Our independent variable is SE policies and is labelled as STAKEHOL_ENGAG. It is measured 
as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company explains how it engages with its 
stakeholders and complies with regulations regarding SE, resolutions or proposals and 0, 
otherwise (Dal Maso et al., 2017). We are not examining the quality or levels of SE, but if firms 
implement SE policies. Our moderating variable is firm performance, denoted by Q_TOBIN, 
and is calculated as the ratio between of the market capitalization of common stock plus the 
book value liabilities divided by the book value of total assets (Pucheta-Martínez et al., 2018).  
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3.4 Control variables 
We control other potential factors that may influence environmental reporting. The first 
control variable used is firm size, SIZE, calculated as the log of total assets, consistent with 
Alsaifi et al. (2020) and Kong et al. (2020). The second control variable employed is the 
leverage, denoted by LEV and calculated as the ratio between debts over total assets (Dal Maso 
et al., 2017; Wei et al., 2020). Board size is another control variable used, labelled as B_SIZE 
and measured as the total number of directors on board (Tingbani et al., 2020). 
CSR_COMMITTEE is also a control variable used, which is calculated as a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the company has a CSR committee and 0, otherwise (Dal Maso et al., 
2017). Female directors are also controlled, labelled as FEM_DIRECT and calculated as the 
ratio between the total numbers of female directors on boards and total number of directors on 
boards (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez, 2019). Other control variable board 
independence, denoted by B_INDEP and calculated as the ratio between the total numbers of 
independent directors on boards and total number of directors on boards, in line with Pucheta-
Martínez and Gallego-Álvarez (2019). Furthermore, we also take into account the variable 
regions (Asia, Europe, North America and Oceania) (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez 
(2019), which is calculated as a dummy variable which take a value 1 if the country of the 
sample belongs to the region examined and 0, otherwise. Moreover, we use the variable industry 
type denoted as INDUSTRY and is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
firm operates in the industry analysed and 0, otherwise. As indicated above, we use the nine 
economic sectors considered by Thomson Reuters TRBC: basic materials, consumer cyclical, 
consumer non-cyclical, energy, healthcare, industrials, technology, telecommunication services 
and utilities. Finally, we use the year fixed effects (YEAR) calculated as a set of dummies 
variables. Table 4 offers a summary of all the variables addressed in this paper.  
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Regression model specification 
The hypothesis proposed will be estimated with the following model: 
 
ENV_REPORTit= β0 + β1STAKEHOL_ENGAGit + β2Q_TOBINit + 
β3STAKEHOL_ENGAGxQ_TOBINit + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit +β6 B_SIZEit + 
β7CSR_COMMITTEEit + β8FEM_DIRECTit + β9B_INDEPit + β10EUROPEit + 
β11NORTHAMERICAit + β12OCEANIAit + β13BASIC MATERIALSit + 
β14CONSUMER CYCLICALit + β15CONSUMER NON-CYCLICALit + β16ENERGYit 
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+ β17HEALTHCAREit + β18INDUSTRIALSit + β19TECHNOLOGYit + 
β20TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICESit + ∑ βjYEARt + Ʋi + ðit 
 
Where “i” represents each firm and “t” the year. Additionally, Ʋi represents the 
unobservable heterogeneity (firm-fixed effects) and is controlled because may potentially be 
associated with environmental reporting. These firm-fixed effects are constant over time, but 
vary among individuals. Finally, ðit represents the error term and does vary over time among 
firms.  
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator has become one of the main 
statistical tools for the analysis of economic and financial data. Thus, in this research we use 
the GMM procedure developed for dynamic models of panel data (Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998, 2000). The GMM estimator will allow us to solve the problems of 
serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity in the model (Leitao, 2010). The GMM 
estimator is more powerful and consistent than other procedures because it addresses the 
unobservable heterogeneity and deals with potential endogeneity issues. Furthermore, the 
GMM also mitigates the estimation bias.  
The following statistics are provided by the GMM: the Wald χ2 test, the Arellano–Bond 
tests AR(1) and AR(2), and the Hansen test. The model fitness is assessed by the Wald χ2 
statistic. With the Arellano-Bond statistic AR(2) will assess if a second-order serial correlation 
in the first difference residuals exists. The rejection of the null hypothesis of ‘no serial 
correlations’ supports the non-existence of second-order serial correlation. Lastly, the Hansen 
test of over-identifying restrictions also allows us to assess the fitness of the instruments 
considered in the model. The rejection of the null hypothesis of non-correlation between the 
instruments and the error term shows us that the instruments are appropriate.  
 
4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 summarise the mean, standard deviation, and the percentiles 25, 50 and 75. The 
score of the environmental information disclosed is 25.30% of the 58 items analysed in the 
environmental disclosure index. Additionally, 36.4% of firms in our sample explain how they 
engage with its stakeholders and comply with regulations regarding SE, resolutions or 
proposals. This figure shows that more than a third of the companies in the sample has a SE 
policy, suggesting that firms are more and more interested in stakeholders’ needs and demands. 
Corporate performance is, on average, 0.74. Additionally, firm size (SIZE) is 10.86 (log of total 
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assets, expressed in euros), the level of leverage (LEV) is, on average, 24.85% and the number 
of board members (B_SIZE) is, on average, 12.53. The proportion of independent board 
directors (B_INDEP) is 81.60%, the proportion of female directors on boards (FEM_DIRECT) 
is 13.75% and firms with a CSR committee (CSR_COMMITTEE) is, on average, 63.30%. 
Concerning the regions where firms are domiciled, 12.60% of the firms are located in Asia 
(ASIA), 29.40% in Europe (EUROPE), 52.80% in North America (NORTHAMERICA) and 
5% in Oceania (OCEANIA). Finally, the basic materials (BASIC MATERIALS) sector 
accounts for 12.00%, consumer cyclical (CONSUMER CYCLICAL) 17.90%, consumer non-
cyclical (CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL) 7.30%, energy (ENERGY) 8%, healthcare sector 
(HEALTHCARE) 10.80%, industrials (INDUSTRIALS) 21.30%, technology 
(TECHNOLOGY) 7.80%, telecommunications services (TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES) 4.60%, and utilities (UTILITIES) 10.00%.  
Insert Table 5 here 
In Table 6, we present the correlation matrix in order to assess if multicollinearity 
concerns exist. As shown in Table 6, all the coefficients are lower than 0.8 (Archambeault and 
DeZoort, 2001), suggesting that there are no multicollinearity problems.  
Insert Table 6 here 
 
4.2. Regressions analysis 
In Table 7, we report the findings of the two models estimated with the GMM estimator.  
In Model 1, we explore the association between SE and environmental reporting. The variable 
SE (STAKEHOL_ENGAG) exhibits a positive sign and is statistically significant. Thus, the 
hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. This finding suggests that firms with SE policies tend to 
disclose environmental information, consistent with Adams and Frost (2006), who demonstrate 
the positive effect of SE on reporting CSR issues through the firms’ web page, and Dobbs and 
Van Staden (2016), who show the positive association between SE and voluntary reporting. . 
Furthermore, authors such as Favotto et al. (2016) find that SE is essential in the disclosure of 
environmental information, which results in a better financial performance. Moreover, SE may 
be considered as an instrument for dialogic communication and for learning in an interactive 
mutual way between firms and stakeholders. In this regard, this communication allows them to 
learn and change from this collaboration some aspects such as strategies, behaviours and 
expectations, as well as may promote social changes or disclose more environmental 
information. The disclosing of environmental issues by firms may improve their reputation and 
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legitimacy. Then, the implementation of SE strategies may be a driver for reaching this goal 
because SE policies are positively associated with environmental disclosure.  
The Model 2 analyses the moderating effect of firm performance on the relationship 
between SE and environmental reporting. The variables SE (STAKEHOL_ENGAG) and firm 
performance (Q_TOBIN) provide a positive sign and are statistically significant. The 
interaction term between SE and firm performance (STAKEHOL_ENGAG x Q_TOBIN) 
presents a negative sign and is statistically significant. Thus, we have to reject the second 
hypothesis. Our evidence suggests that firms with SE policies do not impact strongly on 
environmental reporting if they get a higher firm performance. In other words, a good corporate 
performance moderates negatively the positive relationship between SE and the disclosure of 
environmental information, which supports a substitutive role of a greater firm performance 
with the implementation of SE policies in firms, and not a complementary role, as we predicted.  
This finding suggests that both firm performance and SE policies mechanisms are substitute 
more than complementary because when coexisting, have a negative effect on the reporting of 
environmental information.  
According to the control variables, in both models the variable CSR Committee (CSR_ 
COMMITTEE), the proportion of female directors on board (FEM_DIRECT) and the region 
Europe (EUROPE) present a positive sign and are statistically significant. Therefore, firms 
domiciled in Europe, with female directors on boards and with a CSR committee are more likely 
to report information about environmental issues. The remainder of control variables are not 
significant from a statistical point of view.  
Insert Table 6 here 
5. CONCLUSION 
This study aims to investigate if SE policies encourage environmental reporting in a sample of 
international firms. Furthermore, we also examine the moderating role played by firm 
performance on the relationship between SE and environmental reporting.  
Our findings show that firms with SE policies are more likely to disclose environmental 
information. We also find that a better firm performance moderates negatively the relationship 
between SE policies and environmental disclosure. The coexistence of both mechanisms, SE 
strategies and a good corporate performance, can be considered as substitute more than 
complementary tools in environmental issues since their combination reduces the disclosure of 
environmental information.  
The results of the study have several implications. Firstly, this paper sheds new insights 
into the benefits of implementing SE policies in firms because they are likely to enhance the 
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reporting of environmental information. However, the interaction of SE strategies with a better 
corporate performance has a negative effect in environmental disclosure. Our evidence is useful 
for firms interested in both improving firm performance and disclosing environmental matters 
because if they have also SE policies will lead to a lesser reporting of environmental 
information. Thus, companies and firms’ managers oriented toward environmental goals in 
order to engage with stakeholders needs and demands will have to decide if enhancing firm 
performance or implementing SE policies. Secondly, our evidence may be useful for policy-
makers when regulating or recommending about environmental reporting. They should 
encourage companies involved in environmental issues to be more concerned in implementing 
SE policies and in moderating the increase in firm performance, because the coexistence of 
both mechanisms, firm performance and SE strategies, mitigates the reporting of environmental 
information. Thirdly, this research offers an opportunity to extend past evidence based on 
stakeholder theory since we address how firm performance moderates the association between 
SE policies and environmental disclosure. Earlier research is focused on analysing the factors 
increasing the disclosure of CSR or environmental information, but there is no previous 
evidence of the moderating role of corporate performance between SE policies and the 
disclosure of environmental matters, to the best of our knowledge. Finally, stakeholders 
interested in getting environmental disclosures from firms should take into account if 
companies have SE policies and if they tend to be profitable firms. In this latter case, the 
information about environmental issues may be limited.  
Our study has limitations that serve as venues for future research. Firstly, we analyse the 
moderating role of firm performance on the relationship between SE and environmental 
disclosure by focusing on a sample of international non-financial firms. Future research could 
extend our research to financial entities. Secondly, this study does not address the effect of the 
worldwide crisis on the relationship between SE and environmental disclosure. We have not 
analysed how the worldwide financial crisis could impact on the relationship between SE and 
environmental reporting. Thirdly, as we deal with a cross-country sample, other researchers 
extending our research may enrich it by using country-level variables. Finally, future research 
may also consider to enhance the model proposed introducing some mediating variables such 
as board composition or female directors, among others, in order to explore their effect on the 
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Number of observations by country 
Country  Observations Percentage Cum. 
Australia 696 4.14% 4.14% 
Austria 67 0.40% 4.54% 
Belgium 150 0.89% 5.43% 
Canada 2,151 12.80% 18.23% 
Denmark 281 1.67% 19.90% 
Finland 202 1.20% 21.10% 
Germany 516 3.07% 24.17% 
Ireland 319 1.90% 26.07% 
Japan 2,129 12.67% 38.74% 
Netherlands 286 1.70% 40.44% 
New Zealand 151 0.90% 41.34% 
Norway 84 0.50% 41.84% 
Sweden 605 3.60% 45.44% 
Switzerland 497 2.96% 48.40% 
United Kingdom 1,948 11.59% 59.99% 
United States  6,725 40.01% 100.0% 
Total  16,807 100%  
 
Table 2 
Number of observations by industry 
 






Basic Materials 2,027 12.06% 12.06% 
Consumer Cyclicals 3,011 17.92% 29.98% 
Consumer Non-cyclicals 1,227 7.30% 37.28% 
Energy 1,346 8.01% 45.29% 
Healthcare 1,820 10.83% 56.12% 
Industrials 3,592 21.37% 77.49% 
Technology 1,326 7.89% 85.38% 
Telecommunications services 773 4.60% 89.98% 
Utilities 1,685 10.02% 100.0% 
























Environmental disclosure items 
 
Resource use Emissions Innovation 
Environment management team 
 
VOC emissions reduction Eco-design products 
Environment management training  
Particulate matter emission reduction 
 
Noise reduction 
Environmental materials sourcing  






Toxic chemicals reduction 
e-Waste reduction Environmental assets under MGT 
 
Renewable energy use 




Staff transportation impact reduction 
 
Environmental project financing 
 














Environmental supply chain 
partnership termination 
 
Policy emissions Organic products initiatives 
Land environmental impact 
reduction 
 
Targets emissions Product impact minimisation 
Resource reduction policy 
 
 
Biodiversity impact reduction 
 
Take-back and recycling initiatives 
Water efficiency policy  
Emissions trading 
 
Responsible use of environmental 
products 
Energy efficiency policy  




Sustainable packaging policy  
NOx and SOx emissions reduction 
Agrochemical products 
 
Environment supply chain policy 
 
VOC or particulate matter emissions 
 
Agrochemical 5% revenue 
 
Resource reduction targets 
 
 Environmental products 
Resource reduction policy 
 
 Animal testing in the last 12fy 
 
Animal testing cosmetics 
Water efficiency policy   
Animal testing reduction 
Energy efficiency policy   
Renewable clean energy products 
Sustainable packaging policy   
Water technologies 
Environment supply chain policy   
Sustainable building products 
Resource reduction targets   



























ENV_REPORT The ratio between the aggregation of 58 items focused on environmental issues and the 
total number of items analysed. If the company discloses information concerning each 
item, it will take the value 1, and 0 otherwise 
STAKEHOL_ENGAG Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company explains how it engages with its 
stakeholders and complies with regulations regarding stakeholder engagement, 
resolutions or proposals 
Q_TOBIN The market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book 
value of total assets 
SIZE The log of total assets 
LEV Debt over total assets 
B_SIZE Number of directors on board 
CSR_COMMITTEE Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has a CSR committee, and 0 
otherwise 
FEM_DIRECT Proportion of female directors on boards = Total number of female directors on boards / 
Total number of directors on boards 
B_INDEP Proportion of independent directors on boards = Total number of independent directors 
on boards / Total number of directors on boards 
ASIA Dummy variable: 1 = If the country is in Asia; 0 = Otherwise 
EUROPE Dummy variable: 1 = If the country is in Europe; 0 = Otherwise 
NORTHAMERICA Dummy variable: 1 = If the country is in North America; 0 = Otherwise 
OCEANIA Dummy variable: 1 = If the country is in Oceania; 0 = Otherwise 
BASIC MATERIALS Dummy variable: 1= Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise 
CONSUMER CYCLICAL Dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise 
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL 
Dummy variable: 1= Consumer Non-Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise 
ENERGY Dummy variable: 1= Energy; 0 = Otherwise 
HEALTHCARE Dummy variable: 1= Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise 
INDUSTRIALS Dummy variable: 1= Industrial; 0 = Otherwise 
TECHNOLOGY Dummy variable: 1= Technology; 0 = Otherwise 
TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES 
Dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise 




Mean, standard deviation and quartiles (25, 50 and 75). ENVIR_DISCL is the ratio between the aggregation of 58 items focused on 
environmental issues and the total number of items analysed. If the company discloses information concerning each item, it will take the value 
1, and 0 otherwise; STAKEHOL_ENGAG Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company explains how it engages with its stakeholders 
and complies with regulations regarding shareholder engagement, resolutions or proposals and 0, otherwise; Q_TOBIN is the market 
capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book value of total assets; SIZE is the log of total assets; LEV is debt 
over total assets; B_SIZE is the total number of directors on boards; CSR_COMMITTEE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company has a CSR committee, and 0 otherwise; FEM_DIR is the proportion of female directors on boards= Total number of female directors 
on boards/Total number of directors on boards; B_INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards= Total number of independent 
on boards/ Total number of directors on boards; ASIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Asia, 0=Otherwise; EUROPE is a dummy 
variable: 1= If the country is in Europe, 0=Otherwise; NORTHAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in North America, 
0=Otherwise; OCEANIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Oceania, 0=Otherwise; BASIC MATERIALS is a dummy variable: 1= 
Basic Materials, 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical, 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Non-Cyclical, 0 = Otherwise; ENERGY is a dummy variable: 1= Energy, 0= Otherwise; 
HEALTHCARE is a dummy variable: 1= Healthcare, 0 = Otherwise; INDUSTRIALS is a dummy variable: 1= Industrial, 0 = Otherwise; 
TECHNOLOGY is a dummy variable: 1= Technology, 0 = Otherwise; TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES is a dummy variable: 1= 




Variable Obs. Mean Standard Deviation 
Q25 Q50 Q75 
ENV_REPORT 16,807 0.253 0.184 0.078 0.255 0.412 
STAKEHOL_ENGAG 16,807 0.364 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Q_TOBIN 16,807 0.740 0.478 0.551 0.682 0.837 
SIZE 16,807 10.860 1.620 10.566 11.024 11.53 
LEV 16,807 24.853 13.781 5.778 12.431 21.011 
B_SIZE 16,807 12.526 3.899 9.600 12.000 14.400 
CSR_COMMITTEE 16,807 0.633 0.514 0.000 1.000 1.000 
FEM_DIRECT 16,807 13.748 12.080 0.000 12.222 22.000 
B_INDEP 16,807 81.604 28.393 73.333 91.667 100.000 
ASIA 16,807 0.126 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.000 
EUROPE 16,807 0.294 0.457 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NORTHAMERICA 16,807 0.528 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 
OCEANIA 16,807 0.050 0.245 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BASIC MATERIALS 16,807 0.120 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONSUMER CYCLICAL 16,807 0.179 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CONSUMER NON-
CYCLICAL 
16,807 0.073 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ENERGY 16,807 0.080 0.281 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HEALTHCARE 16,807 0.108 0.295 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INDUSTRIALS 16,807 0.213 0.412 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TECHNOLOGY 16,807 0.078 0.262 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TELECOMMUNICATION 
SERVICES 
16,807 0.046 0.179 0.000 0.000 0.000 





ENVIR_DISCL is the ratio between the aggregation of 58 items focused on environmental issues and the total number of items analysed. If the company discloses information concerning each item, it will take the value 
1, and 0 otherwise; STAKEHOL_ENGAG Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company explains how it engages with its stakeholders and complies with regulations regarding shareholder engagement, resolutions 
or proposals and 0, otherwise; Q_TOBIN is the market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book value of total assets; SIZE is the log of total assets; LEV is debt over total assets; B_SIZE 
is the total number of directors on boards; CSR_COMMITTEE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has a CSR committee, and 0 otherwise; FEM_DIR is the proportion of female directors on boards= 
Total number of female directors on boards/Total number of directors on boards; B_INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards= Total number of independent on boards/ Total number of directors on 
boards; ASIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Asia, 0=Otherwise; EUROPE is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Europe, 0=Otherwise; NORTHAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is 
in North America, 0=Otherwise; OCEANIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Oceania, 0=Otherwise; BASIC MATERIALS is a dummy variable: 1= Basic Materials, 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICAL 
is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical, 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Non-Cyclical, 0 = Otherwise; ENERGY is a dummy variable: 1= Energy, 0= Otherwise; 
HEALTHCARE is a dummy variable: 1= Healthcare, 0 = Otherwise; INDUSTRIALS is a dummy variable: 1= Industrial, 0 = Otherwise; TECHNOLOGY is a dummy variable: 1= Technology, 0 = Otherwise; 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES is a dummy variable: 1= Telecommunication Services, 0 = Otherwise and UTILITIES is a dummy variable: 1= Utilities, 0 = Otherwise. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-
value<0.01. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
ENV_REPORT (1)  1.000                      
STAKEHOL_ENGAG (2) 0,572*** 1.000                     
Q_TOBIN (3) -0.004 -0.005 1.000                    
SIZE (4) 0,533*** 0.396*** -0.024** 1.000                   
LEV (5) 0.144*** 0.096*** 0.689*** 0.278*** 1.000                  
B_SIZE (6) 0,345*** 0.223*** -0.030*** 0.550*** 0.182*** 1.000                 
CSR_COMMITTEE (7) 0,618*** 0.423*** 0.010 0.321*** 0.097*** 0.216*** 1.000                
FEM_DIRECT (8) 0,149*** 0.202*** 0.031*** 0.143*** 0.070*** 0.135*** 0.120*** 1.000               
B_INDEP (9) 0,021 0.135*** -0.074*** 0.139*** 0.061*** 0.135*** -0.003 0.389*** 1.000              
ASIA (10) 0,219*** -0.042*** 0.015 0.132*** 0.053*** 0.074*** 0.131*** -0.434*** -0.580*** 1.000             
EUROPE (11) 0,171*** 0.234*** 0.102*** -0.001 0.025** 0.003 0.072*** 0.113*** 0.144*** -0.284*** 1.000            
NORTHAMERICA (12) -0,233*** -0.155*** -0.236*** 0.043*** -0.042*** 0.114*** -0.131*** 0.209*** 0.313*** -0.358*** -0.610*** 1.000           
OCEANIA (13) -0,163*** -0.064*** 0.212*** -0.243*** -0.060*** -0.285*** -0.069*** 0.027*** -0.017* -0.137*** -0.203*** -0257*** 1.000          
BASIC MATERIALS (14) 0,071*** 0.102*** -0.049*** -0.065*** -0.054*** -0.069*** 0.103*** -0.087*** 0.012 -0.013 0.026*** -0.082*** 0.104*** 1.000         
CONSUMER CYCLICAL (15) -0,068*** -0.083*** 0.016 -0.071*** -0.020** -0.009 -0.058*** 0.036*** -0.113*** 0.005 -0.012 -0.009 0.035*** -0.199*** 1.000        
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL (16) 0,038*** 0.065*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.074*** 0.082*** 0.053*** 0.145*** 0.029*** -0.029*** 0.034*** -0.006 -0.002 -0.132*** -0.166*** 1.000       
ENERGY (17) -0,102*** 0.001 -0.148*** 0.037*** -0.90*** -0.034*** -0.009 -0.060*** 0.057*** -0.107*** -0.080*** 0.161*** -0.018* -0.123*** -0.154*** -0.103*** 1.000      
HEALTHCARE (18) -0,069*** -0.036*** -0.131*** -0.051*** -0.089*** -0.057*** -0.051*** 0.038*** 0.087*** -0.046*** 0.016 0.013 0.008 -0.125*** -0.156*** -0.104*** -0.096*** 1.000     
INDUSTRIALS (19) 0,038*** -0.067*** 0.171*** 0.006 0.111*** 0.041*** -0.014 -0.107*** -0.070*** 0.134*** 0.062*** -0.130*** -0.053*** -0.210*** -0.262*** -0.175*** -0.162*** -0.164*** 1.000    
TECHNOLOGY (20) 0,015 -0.036*** -0.137*** -0.049*** -0.221*** -0.074*** -0.065*** -0.036*** -0.028*** 0.041*** -0.055*** 0.071*** -0.069*** -0.124*** -0.154*** -0.103*** -0.095*** -0.097*** -0.163*** 1.000   
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES (21) 0,0030 0.042*** 0.080*** 0.096*** 0.113*** 0.055*** -0.005 0.058*** 0.057*** -0.021** 0.045*** -0.028** 0.001 -0.074*** -0.092*** -0.062*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.097*** -0.057*** 1.000  




















Q_TOBIN  0.229** (0.038) 




































































ENVIR_DISCL is the ratio between the aggregation of 58 items focused on environmental issues and the total number of items analysed. If the company discloses information concerning each item, it will take the value 
1, and 0 otherwise; STAKEHOL_ENGAG Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company explains how it engages with its stakeholders and complies with regulations regarding shareholder engagement, resolutions 
or proposals and 0, otherwise; Q_TOBIN is the market capitalization of common stock+ book value liabilities divided by the book value of total assets; SIZE is the log of total assets; LEV is debt over total assets; B_SIZE 
is the total number of directors on boards; CSR_COMMITTEE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has a CSR committee, and 0 otherwise; FEM_DIR is the proportion of female directors on boards= 
Total number of female directors on boards/Total number of directors on boards; B_INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards= Total number of independent on boards/ Total number of directors on 
boards; ASIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Asia, 0=Otherwise; EUROPE is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Europe, 0=Otherwise; NORTHAMERICA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is 
in North America, 0=Otherwise; OCEANIA is a dummy variable: 1= If the country is in Oceania, 0=Otherwise; BASIC MATERIALS is a dummy variable: 1= Basic Materials, 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER CYCLICAL 
is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Cyclical, 0 = Otherwise; CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL is a dummy variable: 1= Consumer Non-Cyclical, 0 = Otherwise; ENERGY is a dummy variable: 1= Energy, 0= Otherwise; 
HEALTHCARE is a dummy variable: 1= Healthcare, 0 = Otherwise; INDUSTRIALS is a dummy variable: 1= Industrial, 0 = Otherwise; TECHNOLOGY is a dummy variable: 1= Technology, 0 = Otherwise; 
























Year effects Yes Yes 
Wald χ2 test 5144.05*** 4884.80*** 
Arellano−–Bond test AR(1) (z, p>|z|) −1.24 (0.216) −1.55 (0.120) 
Arellano−–Bond test AR(2) (z, p>|z|) −1.35 (0.176) −1.43 (0.153) 
Hansen test (chi−square, p>|chi2|) 29.68 (0.236) 19.66(0.765) 
